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[T]he conviction persists—though history shows it to be a hallucination—that all the 
questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the 
alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in fact, intellectual progress usually occurs 
through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume—an 
abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not 
solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new 
questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. 
Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest 
precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific 
revolution that found its climax in the “Origin of Species.” 
—John Dewey, 1910.1 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
1 “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.” in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other 
Essays. New York: Henry Holt and Company (1910): 1–19. 
1. Introduction 
Social scientists have long considered punishment to be one of the most promising 
candidates for a ‘human universal’—a pan-cultural behaviour common across all human societies: 
from tribes of hunter-gatherers, to flourishing industrial civilisations.2 Due its ubiquity, 
punishment has, in the last decade or so, become a major topic of interest for evolutionary theorists 
looking to explain the origins of modern human behaviour in terms of natural selection.3 For 
centuries prior to this, however, philosophers have been questioning the rationale behind 
punishment.  
The main philosophical question about punishment is justificatory. Is it morally 
permissible to punish? And if so, why? There are two main kinds of philosophical answers to this 
question.4 Consequentialists maintain that punishment is justified because it brings about good 
consequences.5 And retributivists maintain that punishment is justified because wrongdoers 
inherently deserve to be punished.6 Recent psychological evidence suggests that people endorse 
both retributivism and consequentialism in principle. But in practice, experiments have shown 
people are motivated to punish solely for retributive concerns, and by strong emotional reactions 
to wrongdoing.7 
This paper has two primary aims. The first is to provide an evolutionary explanation for 
why punishment is retributively motivated. And the second is to re-evaluate the philosophical 
theory of retributivism, from an evolutionary perspective. The method of the paper will be 
naturalistic, in the sense that I will rely heavily on scientific research, and will avoid positing 
																																																						
2 Morris Hoffman and Timothy Goldsmith, “The biological roots of punishment.” Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law. 1 (2003): 627–641, at 627. 
3 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution. 
(Princeton University Press, 2013), 4.  
4 David Wood, “Punishment: consequentialism.” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 6 (2010): 455–469, at 
456. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Kevin Carlsmith and John Darley, “Psychological aspects of retributive justice.” Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2008): 193–236, at 209. 
anything empirically unprovable. I will draw from a variety of academic disciplines, including 
anthropology, economics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy—but I will present 
my argument in an analytic philosophical style. 
In chapter 2, I define punishment, lay some conceptual groundwork, examine a body of 
empirical evidence about punishment. In chapter 3, I investigate what it means to explain a 
behaviour in terms of evolution by natural selection, and I construct an explanatory framework 
with which to present an evolutionary exposition of human punishment. Following this, I present 
an evolutionary exposition of punishment in humans. I argue that the biological function of 
punishment in ancestral human groups was to sustain cooperation. I contend that an emotionally-
driven, retributive psychology evolved as the principal mechanism for punishment, because it was 
an effective and reliable instrument for motivating humans to behave in ways that increased group-
level reproductive success. Finally, I explain why modern humans are motivated to punish for 
emotionally-driven retributive reasons. My explanation, in essence, is that the psychological 
mechanism for punishment that evolved in ancestral humans persists in the psychology of modern 
humans. 
In chapter 4, I turn to the second aim of this paper: a re-evaluation of retributivism. First, 
I expound Greene’s theory about the psychological processes that underpin moral judgement, and 
link his theory to punitive-decision making.8 Next, I introduce and defend Greene’s empirical 
explanation for the existence of deontological philosophy. Combining my evolutionary exposition 
of human punishment with Greene’s account of deontological moral philosophy, I argue that 
retributivism is not, first and foremost, a philosophical theory of punishment. Instead, it is a post 
hoc rationalisation of the emotionally driven retributive psychology that evolved in ancestral 
humans for the function of motivating punishment. I conclude that retributivism should no longer 
																																																						
8	Joshua Greene, “The secret joke of Kant’s soul.” Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: 
Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development 3 (2008): 35–79.	
be considered a justificatory theory of punishment, and that it should instead be considered a 
linguistic expression of an evolutionarily ancient psychological predisposition to punish. 
 
2. What is Punishment? 
Philosophical interest in punishment usually stops at legal punishment. Legal punishment 
is state-administered, and is delivered by penal institutions such as the criminal justice system. 
Plainly, however, not all punishment is legal. Parents punish misbehaving children, and teachers 
punish disruptive students. Across both legal and non-legal contexts, punishment can be defined 
as the intentional imposition of some sort of cost, hardship or burden in response to a believed 
wrongful act or omission, as an expression of condemnation or censure of that wrongful act or 
omission.9 For scientific purposes, however, this definition comprises an uneasy mixture of 
behavioural and psychological criteria. Nakao and Machery define punishment in more general 
terms, as “any action that harms another organism, where that action is elicited by some specific 
harmful action (or trait) performed by the punished organism.”10 From a biological point of view, 
this definition has the advantage of applying to both humans and non-human species. But it has 
the disadvantage of including actions that do not intuitively count as punishment, such as self-
defence.  
Building on Nakao and Machery’s approach, Cushman defines punishment as: “actions 
that harm another organism for the purposes of modifying their behaviour.”11 Cushman 
characterises punishment not as a class of behaviour, but instead as a functionally-defined natural 
kind of behaviour. I am partial to Cushman’s definition, but it is worth recognising that it counts 
																																																						
9 Alec Walen, “Retributive Justice.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-
retributive/>. 
10 Hisashi Nakao and Edouard Machery, “The evolution of punishment.” Biology and Philosophy 
27, no. 6 (2012): 833–850, at 834–5. 
11 Fiery Cushman, “Punishment in humans: From intuitions to institutions.” Philosophy 
Compass 10, no. 2 (2015): 117–133, at 123.  
quite a wide range of human actions as punishment. These actions can be grouped into three forms 
of punishment: direct, exclusion-based, and reputation-based.12 Direct punishments are actions 
that cause direct harm or a reduction in the payoffs for an individual, such as hitting, hurting, 
seisure of property, or fining. Exclusion-based punishments are actions that cause harm by 
removing an individual from some beneficial interaction or group, such as banishment, ostracism, 
or shunning. And reputation-based punishments are actions that cause harm by expressing 
attitudes of condemnation or disapprobation; either publically, as in denouncement, or privately, 
as in gossiping.   
As well as identifying the types of human behaviour that count as punishment, it is 
important to note that two kinds of relationship can occur between wrongdoers, victims of 
wrongdoing, and punishers.13 The first kind of relationship is second-party punishment, which 
occurs when an original victim of wrongdoing delivers punishment directly to a wrongdoer, as in 
the case of Alice punching Bob for stealing her food. And the second kind of relationship is third-
party punishment, which occurs when punishment is not delivered to a wrongdoer by the original 
victim of wrongdoing, but is instead delivered by a third party on the victim’s behalf, as in the case 
of Carol punching Bob, for stealing Alice’s food. 
 
2.1. The Philosophy of Punishment 
The main philosophical question about punishment is justificatory.14 Why is it morally 
permissible to punish, if at all? Answers to this question are diverse, but a useful way to think 
about the question is to distinguish between two super-categories of justificatory theories: 
consequentialist theories, and retributivist theories.15 
																																																						
12 Chandra Sripada, “Punishment and the strategic structure of moral systems.” Biology and 
philosophy 20, no. 4 (2005): 767–789, at 779.  
13 Cushman, “Punishment,” 124. 
14 Wood, “Punishment: consequentialism,” 456. 
15 Morris Hoffman, The Punisher’s Brain: The Evolution of Judge and Jury. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 334. 
Consequentialist theories hold that punishment is justified because of its future benefits.16 
In other words, consequentialists are only interested the pragmatic rationale behind punishment.17 
One of the early formulations of the consequentialist justification of punishment was offered by 
Jeremy Bentham.18 For Bentham, punishment was only justifiable insofar as it contributed to the 
greater good of society. And the way punishment achieved this, according to Bentham, was by 
deterring criminals from committing crime in the future. This function of punishment is now 
referred to as ‘special deterrence’, and it is usually contrasted with ‘general deterrence’, the idea 
that punishment should function to discourage not only criminals from committing crime, but 
also deter law-abiding members of society.19  Other influential consequentialist justifications of 
punishment include ‘incapacitation’, the idea that criminal incarceration protects law-abiding 
citizens from danger by curtailing the freedom of criminals to commit crime;20 ‘rehabilitation’, the 
idea that punishment should function to safely re-integrate criminals into society; and ‘restitution’, 
the idea that punishment in some sense eliminates the gains made by a criminal, thereby restoring 
the material and psychological wellbeing of the victim of the crime, the victim’s family, or both.21  
Retributivist theories, by contrast, hold that punishment is justified irrespective of its future 
benefits. For retributivists, the rationale of punishment is that guilty wrongdoers intrinsically 
deserve to be punished.22 Contemporary formulations of retributivism are diverse, but they share 
three common elements. The first is the idea that punishment is an intrinsically deserved response 
to wrongdoing, which is often known is the principle of ‘desert’.23 The second is a sense of fairness, 
or justice, in determining the harshness of punishment. Wrongdoers should only be punished in 
																																																						
16 Wood, “Punishment,” 456. 
17 Greene, “Secret joke,” 50.  
18 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Chapters I–V). 
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd, [1789] 1972). 
19 Wood, “Punishment,” 456.  
20 Wood, “Punishment,” 462.  
21 Hoffman, Punisher’s Brain, 344. 
22 David Wood, “Punishment: nonconsequentialism.” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 6 (2010): 470–
482, at 470. 
23 Ibid. 
proportion with their blameworthiness, and the degree of harm they cause. This idea is often 
known as the principle of ‘proportionality’.24 And the third element is the idea that punishment is 
only appropriate when wrongdoers are believed with a reasonable degree of confidence to be 
guilty.25 Early philosophical formulations of retributivism are traceable to Hegel26 and Kant,27 but 
prototypes of retributivism pre-date contemporary Western philosophy by millennia. For example, 
retributive ideas are found in the Old Testament, as in the Mosaic law ‘an eye for an eye.’28  
Although consequentialist and deontological theories of punishment are often held to be 
in tension,29 it is important to recognise that not all justificatory theories of punishment fall 
squarely into either the retributivist or consequentialist category. Pluralistic theories of 
punishment, such as those offered by H. L. A. Hart30 and John Rawls,31 combine both 
consequentialist and retributive elements. Generally, however, the distinction between retributivist 
and consequentialist theories is a useful way to think about the justificatory debate, because it 
captures two very different ways of thinking about the value of punishment. Consequentialists 
appeal to the instrumental value of punishment,32 whereas retributivists appeal to its intrinsic 
value.33  
																																																						
24 Ibid., 471. 
25 Hugo Bedau and Erin Kelly, “Punishment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/punishment/>. 
26 Georg W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Trans. N. B. Nisbet, Ed. Allen Wood. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1821] 1991). 119–131. 
27 Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor (trans.), (New York: Cambridge 
University Press [1797] 1991), 141–142. 
28 Exodus 21: 23–25, The Holy Bible: King James Version. Texas: National Publishing Company 
(2000). 
29 Hoffman, Punisher’s Brain, 344. 
30 H. L. A. Hart, “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 60 (1959–1960): 1–26. 
31 John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules.” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3–32. 
32 Wood, “Punishment: consequentialism,” 457. 
33 Wood, “Punishment: nonconsequentialism,” 470. 
2.2.  The Psychology of Punishment 
In the last two decades, scientific evidence about the psychological motives of punishment 
has emerged from research on punitive decision-making. In general, the aim of this work was to 
determine whether people’s attitudes about punishment aligned with the retributivist rationale for 
punishment, or whether people were instead motivated to punish for consequentialist reasons.34  
An important initial finding was that when people were asked in an abstract way about the 
rationale of punishment, they mentioned both retributivist and consequentialist reasons for 
punishment.35 In other words, people gave answers that appealed to the future benefits of 
punishment (such as deterrence and incapacitation), and they also gave answers that reflected the 
idea that proportional punishment is a deserved response to culpable wrongdoers.36 A natural 
hypothesis to draw from this finding, is that people are motivated to punish for a combination of 
consequentialist and retributivist reasons. As it turned out, however, people’s verbal reports of 
their motives for punishment were a poor reflection of their actual punitive behaviour.  
In one study, subjects were instructed to make punitive judgements in simulated criminal 
cases, and were given the option of learning information pertaining to desert and proportionality 
(the magnitude of harm, the perpetrator’s intent, and extenuating circumstances), or learning 
information pertaining to the future benefits of delivering punishment (frequency of the crime, 
likelihood of detection, and publicity of the crime).37 The first set of information was designed to 
represent retributivist considerations, and the second was designed to represent consequentialist 
considerations. It was found that subjects readily asked for information that was relevant from a 
																																																						
34 Carlsmith and Darley, “Psychological aspects,” 209. 
35 Bernard Weiner, Sandra Graham, and Christine Reyna, “An attributional examination of 
retributive versus utilitarian philosophies of punishment.” Social Justice Research 10, no. 4 (1997): 
431–452, at 450.  
36 Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley, and Paul Robinson, “Why do we punish? Deterrence and just 
deserts as motives for punishment.” Journal of personality and social psychology 83, no. 2 (2002): 284–
299, at 295. 
37 Kevin Carlsmith, “The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment.” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 42, no. 4 (2006): 437–451, at 448. 
retributivist standpoint, and showed very little interest in information that was relevant from 
consequentialist standpoint. Moreover, retributively-relevant information gave people more 
confidence in their punitive decisions, while consequentially-relevant information had the opposite 
effect.  
In a different study, it was found that subjects’ punitive judgements were highly sensitive 
to retributively-relevant factors, such as the severity of the offence, but that consequentially-
relevant factors, such as the likelihood of re-offence, had a minimal influence on their judgments.38 
To test this effect, some subjects were explicitly instructed to make their punitive-decisions in a 
consequentialist way, by focusing on deterrence related factors. Even then, however, those 
subjects were unable to punish in a genuinely consequentialist way. They decided the severity of 
punishment according to retributivist factors, while randomly increasing the severity of 
punishment for the sake of deterrence in a way that did not accurately track factors that were 
relevant to deterrence.  
Another set of studies focused on the origin of the psychological motivation to punish. A 
key finding was that punitive decision-making was closely associated with negative emotions on 
the part of the punisher, such as anger, and disapproval.39 Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson coined 
the term ‘moral outrage’ to describe the sentiment that people feel in reaction to wrongdoing.40 
They found that the extent to which people reported feelings of moral outrage correlated not only 
with the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer and the degree of harm caused, but that moral outrage 
was also good predictor of the severity with which people decided to punish.41 The idea that 
punitive decision-making is closely related to emotion was also found in brain-imaging studies. In 
one study, it was found that the severity of punishment in response to violations of trust was 
																																																						
38 John Darley, Kevin Carlsmith, and Paul Robinson, “Incapacitation and just deserts as motives 
for punishment.” Law and Human behavior 24, no. 6 (2000): 659–683. 
39 Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass Sunstein, “Shared outrage and erratic awards: 
The psychology of punitive damages.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16, no. 1 (1998): 49–86.  
40 Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, “Why do we punish,” 284. 
41 Ibid. 
correlated with the level of activity in the caudate nucleus, a brain region associated with emotion, 
motivation and reward.42 And a different study found that emotionally graphic descriptions of 
harmful acts boosted brain activity in the amygdala, a brain region associated with emotional 
reaction and decision-making, and that amplified punishment severity correlated with increased 
amygdala activity.43 
 
2.3. The Central Question 
Empirical evidence shows that people endorse both retributivist and consequentialist reasons 
for punishment in the abstract, but pay next to no attention to consequentialist considerations 
when punishing. Instead, people were motivated to punish for retributive reasons, which depended 
on factors such as the severity of wrongdoing, and the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer. And 
punitive decision-making was closely connected to negative emotional reactions, such as moral 
outrage. In short, people do not have a good understanding of why they punish at all.  
It is now widely-accepted among cognitive scientists, philosophers, and psychologists, that 
human reasoning is dictated to a significant extent by automatic processes, biases, and unconscious 
heuristics. Daniel Kahneman, a Nobel-prize winning psychologist, describes human reason as 
comprising two distinct processing systems: one that is fast, instinctive and emotional, and another 
that is slower, more deliberative, and more logical.44 And Jonathan Haidt’s well-known work on 
‘moral dumbfounding’ in the psychology of morality showed that moral judgements are largely 
derived from quick, instinctive intuitions that people cannot rationally explain (for instance, the 
intuition that incestuous intercourse is repugnant), rather than careful reasoning about right and 
																																																						
42 Dominique De Quervain, et al., “The neural basis of altruistic punishment.” Science 305, no. 
5688 (2004): 1254–1258. 
43 Michael Treadway, et al., “Corticolimbic gating of emotion-driven punishment.” Nature 
Neuroscience 17, no. 9 (2014): 1270–1275.  
44 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow. (Macmillan, 2011), 20–23. 
wrong.45 Psychologists are increasingly moving towards the view that punitive decision-making is 
also motivated by fast, intuitive psychological processes, rather than slow, rational processes.46 
Carlsmith, for instance, argues that the moral outrage and retributive motives that dominate 
punitive decision-making are the conscious registration of intuitive emotional reactions towards 
wrongdoing.47 And Treadway et al. claim that people rely heavily on emotional heuristics when 
making punitive decisions.48  
This empirical story about punishment raises important questions. Consequentialist 
reasons for punishment (such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), play a clear and 
undeniable role in the justification of punishment. The deterrence of criminal behaviour, the 
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, and the reintegration of prisoners into society are 
fundamental bases for institutional incarceration. And in non-institutional contexts, the logic of 
punishment is plainly connected to beneficial future consequences. When an adult punishes a 
misbehaving child, the aim is to discourage the child from behaving similarly again in the future. 
But if the future benefits of punishment factor so significantly into its rationale, then why 
is it the case that consequentialist considerations are completely absent from the psychological 
processes that occur when people deliver punishments? When asked about the justification of 
punishment in the abstract, people think about consequentialist and retributivist reasons. But why 
do people suddenly forget their consequentialist considerations when asked to make a real punitive 
decision? In other words, why is punitive decision-making psychologically motivated by 
emotionally-driven retributivist intuitions, and not by considerations about the beneficial things 
that punishment brings about?  
																																																						
45 Jonathan Haidt, “The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral 
judgment.” Psychological review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–834. 
46 Kevin Carlsmith et al., “Psychological aspects,” 211. 
47 Ibid., 212. 
48 Treadway et al., “Corticolimbic gating,” 1270. 
In recent decades, an answer to this question has emerged from a combination of 
disciplines, including evolutionary biology, sociobiology, game-theoretic economics, 
anthropology, and evolutionary psychology. In the next chapter, I will present an interdisciplinary 
explanation for why human punishment is motivated by retributive emotion, and not by 
consequentialist considerations.  
 
3. Why is Punishment Retributively Motivated? 
In the same way that early 20th century Western philosophy underwent a ‘linguistic turn’, 
characterised by a tendency to examine the relationship between philosophy and language49—it 
could reasonably be said that the social sciences are in the middle of an ‘evolutionary turn.’ 
Disciplines as diverse as anthropology, economics, jurisprudence, linguistics, and psychology, are 
increasingly explaining the evolution of human behaviours and mental processes in terms of 
natural selection.50 (To clarify, I mean natural selection in the strict, biological sense, where homo 
sapiens is regarded as a species that evolved from natural origins; rather than natural selection in 
the fallacious social-Darwinian sense, where ethics are derived from nature). A wide range of 
human traits have been subject to evolutionary analysis, but one human trait that has received a 
great deal of explanatory attention is ‘altruistic cooperation’.51 Humans have a behavioural 
predisposition to help other humans, including non-kin, and even despite the risk of personal 
disadvantage.52 How and why did humans come to be this way? Recent work in evolutionary theory 
suggests that punishment plays a central role in the answer.53  
																																																						
49 Ronald Allen and Brian Leiter, “Naturalized epistemology and the law of evidence.” Virginia 
Law Review (2001): 1491–1550, at 1493–4.  
50 Ian Gough, et al., “Darwinian evolutionary theory and the social sciences.” Twenty-First Century 
Society 3, no. 1 (2008): 65-86, at 66. 
51 Bowles and Gintis, A Cooperative Species, 4.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 148–150. 
In this chapter, I will examine what it means to explain the evolution of a trait in terms of 
natural selection. Following this, I will develop an explanatory framework with which to present a 
biological exposition of the evolution of human punishment. The aim of this exposition is to 
provide a comprehensive answer to the question that I raised in §2.3. Namely, why is punitive 
decision-making psychologically motivated by emotionally driven retributivist intuitions, and not 
by considerations about the beneficial things that punishment brings about? 
 
3.1. Evolution by Natural Selection 
To start with, a brief outline of evolution by natural selection will be of use. All populations 
of organisms continually undergo change with respect to their behaviour, bodies, and physiology 
(biologists call these changes ‘variations’).54 Variations occur randomly, and are caused at a 
microscopic level by genetic mutations, and by the recombination of parents’ chromosomes during 
sex.55 Sometimes variations will bestow an organism with a reproductively advantageous trait, 
allowing that organism to produce more offspring than its conspecifics (biologists call this 
‘differential reproduction’).56 If the advantageous trait is genetically heritable, then in many cases 
it will be passed on to the offspring of the organism.57 As this pattern repeats itself, the 
advantageous trait can proliferate, and cause evolutionary change in entire populations of 
organisms.58  
There are ongoing debates about many evolutionary concepts, (such as ‘fitness’ and 
‘adaptation’),59 but for present purposes, these debates can be overlooked. It is important to note, 
however, that evolutionary change is not driven by any higher purpose or end-goal.60 Instead, it is 
																																																						
54 Peter Godfrey-Smith, Philosophy of biology. (Princeton University Press, 2013), 30. 
55 Ibid., 39. 
56 Ibid., 30.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 42. 
59 Ibid., 33. 
60 Ibid., 60. 
driven by incremental reproductive advantages that accumulate over the lifecycles of individual 
organisms. 
 
3.2. Functions in Biology 
Some species of horned-lizards (Phrynosoma) exhibit an unusual behaviour known as 
‘autohaemorrhaging’, or ‘reflex bleeding’.61 When a horned-lizard is threatened by a predator, it 
will increase the blood pressure in small sinus chambers under its eye sockets, and squirt a jet-like 
stream of blood from one of its eyes towards the predator, up to distances of 1.2 meters. Predators 
are quickly frightened off by this bizarre exhibition. The function of this autohaemorrhaging 
behaviour seems fairly evident: it protects the lizard from predation. But why is this the function 
of autohaemorrhaging? In everyday parlance, the term ‘function’ is often used in a sense roughly 
synonymous with the terms ‘purpose’ or ‘role.’ In biology, however, the concept of function has 
a more technical meaning, which is associated with evolutionary theory.62 Seeing as the biological 
concept of function will feature regularly throughout this chapter, it is important to examine the 
concept in detail. A good place to start is with Wright’s general theory of functions,63 as it elucidates 
the way functions operate in biology. Wright’s theory, expressed formulaically, is as follows: 
 
“The function of X is that particular consequence of its being where it is which 
explains why it is there.”64  
 
The first point to take from Wright’s theory is that the concept of function in biology is 
associated with a particular kind of explanation. Specifically, biological functions explain ‘why X 
is there.’ Wright’s terminology is somewhat obscure, but in the context of biological functions, ‘X’ 
																																																						
61 Wade Sherbrooke and George Middendorf, “Blood-squirting variability in horned lizards 
(Phrynosoma).” Copeia 2001, no. 4 (2001): 1114–1122, at 1115. 
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stands for any functionally-characterised biological entity, including behaviours such as 
autohaemorrhaging. And the expression ‘is there’ refers to the existence of the functionally-
characterised entity.65 The key to explaining why any functionally-characterised biological entity 
exists, is to recall how evolution by natural selection operates. Heritable traits that increase 
reproductive success are passed on and proliferate in populations.66 The process of evolution by 
natural selection explains why functionally-characterised biological entities exist, and this means 
that the existence of any functionally-characterised biological entity in an organism’s phenotype 
can only be explained by looking backwards in time, to the evolutionary history of that entity.67  
Applied to the horned-lizard case, we find that the proper functional explanation for 
autohaemorrhaging is that autohaemorrhaging enabled horned-lizards to avoid being eaten, to 
survive, and experience more mating opportunities. This reproductive advantage caused the trait 
for autohaemorrhaging to be passed on and proliferated in horned-lizard populations—and this 
explains why autohaemorrhaging exists in the horned-lizard phenotype. 
The second point to take from Wright’s theory is that functional explanations in biology 
only concern the aspect of a biological entity that increases an organism’s reproductive success.68 
The previous example will help to illustrate the point. In addition to the deterrence of predators, 
several ancillary effects are caused when a horned-lizard autohaemorrhages. The lizard’s blood 
volume decreases, it is temporarily blinded by blood, and its eye socket swells. The reason it would 
be strange to explain the function of autohaemorrhaging in terms of any of these ancillary effects, 
is that none explain why autohaemorrhaging exists in the horned-lizard phenotype. The 
functionally-relevant aspect of autohaemorrhaging is the capacity to squirt blood at predators, 
because the ability to avoid predation allowed horned-lizards to survive, to experience more mating 
opportunities, and to pass on the trait for autohaemorrhaging. In other words, the function of a 
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biological trait is not just any effect caused by the trait. Rather, the function of a biological trait is 
the aspect of the trait that explains its existence in the organism’s phenotype.  
Wright’s theory is a good representation of the way functions operate in biology, but it 
does not account for the fact that a trait may be selected for more than one function over the 
course of its evolutionary history.69 To account for this, evolutionary biologists distinguish between 
‘adaptations’ and ‘exaptations’.70 Adaptations are traits that were shaped by natural selection for 
their current function. Exaptations, by contrast, are traits that acquire functions for which they 
were not originally selected.71 In the flightless ancestors of modern birds, such the Archaeopteryx, 
feathers were probably selected for insulation.72 In modern birds, however, feathers were selected 
for the ability to assist with flight. For example, think of the long, stiff feathers of a peregrine 
falcon (Falco peregrinus).73 It would be strange to consider insulation the main function of a peregrine 
falcon’s feathers, because the function of a trait does not necessarily depend on the original reason 
it was selected. Instead, the function of a trait is the reason for a trait’s recent maintenance in a 
selective context.74 A useful way to flesh out this idea is to distinguish between the ‘ancient’ and 
‘modern’ evolutionary history of a biological trait.75 The ancient evolutionary history of a trait 
involves the original selective forces that built the structure of the trait, which account for its initial 
emergence, and its original function.76 The modern history of a trait, by contrast, involves the 
reason a trait was selected for in its most recent selective episode.77 Functional explanations in 
biology concern only the ‘modern’ evolutionary history of traits.  
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Taking these clarifications into consideration, Wright’s general theory of functions can be 
reformulated as follows to represent the way functions operate in biology: 
 
“The function of a biological entity is the aspect of that entity which explains why the 
entity currently exists.” 
 
3.3. The Proximate–Ultimate Distinction 
In 1961, Ernst Mayr introduced a biological distinction between ‘proximate’ causes—the 
immediate physiological responses of an organism and their organs to factors in the environment; 
and ‘ultimate’ causes—the events or factors in the evolutionary history of an organism that shaped 
the trait via natural selection over many generations.78 The proximate–ultimate distinction is 
frequently used as way of understanding evolutionary explanations,79 but there has been substantial 
debate over: (a) whether the proximate–ultimate distinction is appropriate for theoretical use,80 
and (b) the sense in which evolutionary biologists actually use the distinction.81 Seeing as the 
proximate–ultimate distinction is often to organise evolutionary explanations, it is appropriate to 
indicate where I stand on these issues. 
One interpretation of the way biologists use the proximate–ultimate distinction is that the 
expression ‘proximate causes’ is used to refer to factors that operate within the life-span of an 
individual organism; whereas the expression ‘ultimate causes’ is used to refer to processes that 
occurred before the organism was conceived, and which shaped its genome via natural selection.82 
Francis affirms the importance of this conceptual distinction, but he rejects use of the proximate–
ultimate distinction to label it.83 The correct way to refer to the distinction, he argues, is in terms 
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of ‘ontogenetic factors’ and ‘phylogenetic factors.’84 Ontogenetic factors relate to ‘ontogeny’—the 
development of individual organisms, or with the development of the anatomical or behavioural 
features of organisms from the earliest stage to maturity.85 And phylogenetic factors relate to 
‘phylogeny’—the evolutionary development and diversification of a species or group of organisms, 
or of a particular feature of an organism.86  
A different interpretation of how biologists use of the proximate–ultimate distinction, 
offered by Haig, is that the expression ‘proximate causes’ is used to refer to explanations that 
appeal to the local mechanisms that cause a behaviour or trait, and the expression ‘ultimate causes’ 
is used to refer to explanations that appeal to the biological function of a behaviour or trait.87 As 
was the case with Francis, Haig rejects the proximate–ultimate distinction as a label for the 
mechanism–function distinction, on the grounds that the term ‘ultimate’ is too ambiguous.88 
Francis also takes specific issue the term ‘ultimate’, claiming that it has connotations of 
exhaustiveness, fundamentality, and superiority, all of which are inappropriate for theoretic 
contexts.89 In their final analyses, Francis and Haig both deem the proximate–ultimate distinction 
too ambiguous for theoretical use. I agree with this view, and will therefore avoid using the 
proximate–ultimate distinction in my biological exposition of human punishment. 
 
3.4. Tinbergen’s Four Kinds of Explanation 
A different approach to understanding evolutionary explanations is to distinguish between 
four kinds of explanation that can be given for any organism’s behaviour.90 On this approach, 
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which was introduced in 1963 by Nikolaas Tinbergen, any question of the form ‘why does 
organism O exhibit behaviour Φ?’ can be answered in terms of: 
 
(1) The function or ‘survival value’ of Φ.91 
(2) The evolutionary history of Φ. 
(3) The development of Φ throughout the life of O. 
(4) The physiological mechanisms and physical stimuli that cause O to exhibit Φ.92  
 
Tinbergen’s approach is widely-used in contemporary biology,93 and it has a clear 
advantage over the proximate–ultimate distinction, in that it subsumes and differentiates between 
both of the conceptual distinctions identified by Haig and Francis. The distinction between 
phylogenetic factors and ontogenetic factors is represented in (2) and (3), and the distinction 
between function-based explanations and mechanism-based explanations is represented in (1) and 
(4).94 There are, however, a few issues with Tinbergen’s framework.  
Tinbergen treats functional explanations (1) as different in kind to explanations that appeal 
to evolutionary history (2). Yet as I previously argued, functional explanations in biology must 
appeal to evolutionary history.95 Tinbergen’s demarcation between (1) and (2) is at odds with the 
fact that functional explanations in biology necessarily appeal to evolutionary history. Recall, 
however, that functional explanations in biology concern only the modern evolutionary history of 
a trait (i.e., the recent selective maintenance of a trait). The ancient evolution history of a trait (the 
original selective forces that built the structure of a trait and which account for its initial 
emergence) may be irrelevant to the trait’s function, as in the case of the peregrine falcon’s feathers.  
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To account for this, it is worth making two small refinements to Tinbergen’s framework. 
Functional explanations concern only the current function of a trait (i.e., the function that continues 
to be maintained by natural selection), and explanations in terms of evolutionary history concern 
only the origin and phylogenetic distribution of a trait.  
Tinbergen developed his explanatory framework to clarify the scientific method of 
ethology: the study of the evolution of (non-human) animal behaviour in terms of natural selection. 
As such, he did not account for the fact that in humans, behaviours can be triggered by 
psychological mechanisms, such as emotional urges, or practical reasoning.96 It is worth making 
one final refinement to Tinbergen’s framework, to account for the fact that human behaviour is 
often caused by psychological mechanisms. Taking into account all of the above, I will employ the 
following explanatory structure in my evolutionary exposition of punishment in humans: 
 
(1) The current selective function of punishment. 
(2) The origin and phylogenetic distribution of punishment.  
(3) The development of punishment throughout the lives of individual humans. 
(4) The psychological mechanism(s) that cause humans to exhibit punishment.  
 
3.5. Punishment in Humans: An Evolutionary Exposition 
It is an uncontroversial fact that humans have a predisposition to punish other humans.97 
In formal evolutionary theory, the human predisposition to punish is treated as one component 
of a construct known as ‘strong reciprocity.’98 Strong reciprocity involves altruistic preferences, 
which are sentiments that place a positive value on the beneficial outcomes of one’s actions for 
others, even when those actions bear personal costs.99 Strong reciprocity motivates individuals to 
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sacrifice their own payoffs in order to cooperate with others, to reward the cooperation of others, 
and to sacrifice their own payoffs in order to punish non-cooperation.100  
In modern human societies, punishment largely is delivered by institutions such as the 
criminal justice system.101 Yet is not necessary to account for these institutions in what follows, 
because it is highly unlikely that sophisticated punitive institutions existed during the period in 
which the human predisposition for punishment evolved.  
 
3.5.1. The Selective Function of Punishment 
The human predisposition to punish most likely evolved in the Late Pleistocene epoch 
(the period from between about 126 and 12 thousand before the present), in mobile foraging bands 
of hunter-gatherers living in Sub-Saharan Africa.102 In this early stage of human history, life as a 
hunter-gatherer was extremely dangerous. Lethal intergroup warfare was common, resulting in the 
frequent dispersion and eradication of human groups.103  And a harsh, volatile climate meant that 
material resources were scarce.104 Bowles and Gintis hypothesise that in these hostile conditions, 
groups comprising individuals with a predisposition to altruistically help their fellow group 
members experienced increased group-level reproductive success.105 The idea that natural selection 
operates at both the individual-level and the group-level is known as ‘multi-level selection.’106 
According to Bowles and Gintis, within-group altruistic cooperation conferred significant 
reproductive advantages for ancestral humans, in that it allowed humans to form hunting parties, 
to share food and child rearing responsibilities, to team-up in combat, and to collaboratively 
acquire and defend territory.107  
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The function of punishment, (the aspect of punishment that explains why a predisposition 
to punish currently exists in the human phenotype), was to solve a specific problem that arose in 
cooperative groups.108 Cooperation generated reproductive advantages in ancestral humans 
groups, but it also gave individuals the opportunity to exploit the benefits of cooperation, by free-
riding (receiving the gains of cooperation, but contributing nothing in return) and by violating pro-
social norms (breaking rules of behaviour designed to maximise cooperation).109 According to 
Cushman, the function of punishment was to allow early humans to modify the non-cooperative 
behaviour of their fellow group members,110 by teaching them not to exploit the benefits of within-
group cooperation.111  In other words, punishment sent a very strong message to non-cooperators. 
“If you cause harm to the group, or refuse to perform actions that benefit the group, then you will 
be harmed in return.” 
The behaviour-modification function of punishment has been demonstrated in a large 
body of evolutionary mathematical models,112 and has repeatedly been confirmed in game-
theoretic experiments, most notably a series of ‘public goods games’ designed by Fehr and 
Gachter.113 When individuals were permitted to punish the non-cooperative behaviour of others, 
it was found that group-average cooperation increased significantly.114  
 
3.5.2. The Origin and Phylogenetic Distribution of Punishment 
The exact evolutionary origin of human punishment is difficult to pinpoint, because the 
predisposition to punish is thought to be an exaptation, rather than an adaptation. One theory is 
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that the trait for punishment evolved via a two-stage exaptation process, in which a primitive pan-
mammalian aggression system that evolved for the original function of resource protection was 
selected a second time, for the function of preservation of positions in dominance hierarchies; and 
third time, for the function of behaviour-modification.115  
In terms of phylogenetic distribution, the main puzzle in explaining how punishment 
initially emerged and proliferated in ancestral human populations stems from the fact that 
punishment was highly costly for hunter-gatherers to deliver.116 Punishers risked the possibility of 
physical harms, such as retaliation, or social harms, such as resentment.117 Social costs were 
particularly damaging in the Late Pleistocene, as group membership was more or less essential to 
survival.118 Because of this, Bowles and Gintis suggest that the benefits of punishment were 
characterised by increasing returns to scale, meaning that the total cost of punishing declined as 
the number of punishers increased.119 They hypothesise that a specific set of conditions were 
necessary for the early emergence and proliferation of a predisposition to punish. First, 
punishment needed to be contingent on the number of group members who were willing to 
participate.120 This type of collective action is known in biology as ‘quorum sensing’, whereby 
individuals do not behave as a group until there are enough of them to effectively bring about an 
action.121 And second, in order for punishment to be contingent, it needed to be coordinated and 
organised between group members prior to delivery.122 For coordination to be effective, 
individuals likely needed a strong capacity for cheater detection, and norms of truthful information 
sharing.123  
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 3.5.3. The Development of Punishment 
All human traits develop under the influence of a combination of genetic and cultural 
factors.124 Some traits are passed on purely genetically, but by and large, human development is 
significantly affected by learning and enculturation.125 In stable conditions, humans can culturally 
transmit information and artificial environments over thousands of generations.126 Academic 
knowledge, institutions, languages, skills, social norms, and technology are all examples culturally-
transmitted factors.127  
It is possible to roughly differentiate between the genetic basis of a predisposition to 
punish, and the culturally transmissible factors that influence the development of the punitive 
predisposition. The genetically heritable component of punishment is a pre-linguistic 
psychological impulse to harm individuals who exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. And the 
culturally transmitted factor is the set of social norms that individuals learn throughout their life, 
which will influence their beliefs about punishment, including the method by which punishment 
should be delivered, and which actions constitute non-cooperative behaviour. Social norms can 
be transmitted vertically (from parents to offspring), obliquely (from non-parental members of a 
parent’s generation) or horizontally (between individuals of a similar age); but individuals may also 
construct or modify their beliefs about punishment independent of the influence of social 
norms.128 
It is crucial to note, however, that over many generations of human life, genetic and 
cultural factors continuously interact.129 Culturally transmitted factors create artificial 
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environments in which previously non-advantageous mutations become advantageous, are 
selected for, and proliferate.130 In evolutionary theory, this feedback loop is known is as ‘gene–
culture co-evolution.’131 Moreover, culturally transmitted traits can themselves be selected for or 
against, according to the reproductive success that they confer to their carriers. This process is 
commonly known as cultural selection.132 In §3.2, I described the biological concept of function 
only in terms of a genetic selection-mechanism. And in §3.5.1, I described the selective function 
of punishment only in genetic terms. But it is important to acknowledge that many functionally-
characterised humans traits, including punishment, are maintained not just by genetic selection, 
but by a mixture of selection-mechanisms. In what follows, when I refer to the ‘selective function’ 
or ‘function’ of punishment, I recognize the influence that cultural selection and gene–culture co-
evolution will have on the selective maintenance of functionally-characterised human traits. 
Although I am confident that punishment was influenced by an interplay between genes and 
culture, I am uncertain as to the details of how culturally-transmitted social norms influenced the 
genetic basis of a psychological predisposition to punish.  
 
3.5.4. The Psychological Mechanism for Punishment 
In 1971, Robert Trivers proposed the idea that an individual-level psychological 
mechanism known as ‘moralistic aggression’ evolved in ancestral humans, for the function of 
protecting vulnerable altruistic individuals from exploitation by non-cooperators.133 According to 
Trivers, the modus operandi of moralistic aggression was to generate a negative emotional 
response in reaction to non-cooperative behaviour, which would psychologically register as 
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feelings of anger, contempt, or indignation.134 These negative sentiments would then motivate 
altruistic individuals to: 
 
“…educate the unreciprocating individual by frightening him with immediate harm or 
with the future harm of no more aid; and in extreme cases, perhaps, to select directly 
against the unreciprocating individual by injuring, killing, or exiling him.”135 
 
Trivers’ work on moralistic aggression was an early conceptualisation of the view that 
negative emotion is the psychological mechanism for punishment in humans. This view has since 
been endorsed by evolutionary theorists such as Bowles and Gintis, who note that: 
 
“…ethically motivated outrage, what Robert Trivers called ‘moralistic aggression,’ is a 
plausible motivation for the strong reciprocators’ punishment of defectors.”136  
 
Empirical evidence suggests the same conclusion. In a series of public goods experiments, 
Fehr and Gächter hypothesised that: “free-riding may cause strong negative emotions among the 
cooperators and these emotions, in turn, may trigger their willingness to punish the free riders.”137 
This hypothesis was confirmed, as it was found that the severity with which people punished 
instances of free-riding matched self-reports of the intensity of the negative emotions they felt in 
reaction to observations of free-riding.138  
It worth mentioning that positive emotions (as opposed to negative emotions) may also 
play a causal role in human punishment. It is often observed that people find enjoyment and 
satisfaction in successfully punishing individuals who behave non-cooperatively.139 I am unsure as 
to how positive emotions might generate punishment, but one promising view is positive emotions 
act as a kind of reward-mechanism, motivating individuals to punish in anticipation of the 
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satisfaction that follows from punishing.140, 141 For present purposes, however, I will assume that 
negative emotion constitutes the principal psychological mechanism for punishment. 
 
3.6. The Selective Function of Negative Emotion 
The aim of this chapter was to explain why punitive-decision making is motivated by 
retributive emotion and not by consequentialist considerations. To meet this aim, a final matter 
needs to be addressed. Given the likelihood that punishment was both potentially costly and a 
conducive to reproductive success in ancestral human groups, it is somewhat surprising that 
humans evolved an emotion-based mechanism for punishment, rather than a reasoning-based 
mechanism. Mental capacities such as the ability to problem-solve, to engage in rational decision-
making, and to perform complex reasoning tasks, are widely-considered to have played a major 
role in the evolutionary success of humans.142 Given this fact, the question arises: why was 
emotion—an ostensibly irrational feature of human psychology—selected for as the mechanism 
for punishment?  
The most compelling answer to this question is that emotion was selected for its long-term 
strategic role in increasing group-level reproductive success.143 On this view, emotion act as a form 
of ‘commitment device’, motivating individual humans behave in ways that may seem irrational or 
unproductive in the short-term, but which increase reproductive fitness in the long-run.144 
Negative emotion such as anger and indignation reliably motivated humans to punish, 145 because 
these feelings were strong, visceral, and very difficult to cognitively override. In other words, 
negative emotions forced ancestral humans to punish. Negative emotions was also able to bypass 
reason-based decision-making processes about punishment, which may have inhibited long-term 
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reproductive success.146 As Cushman writes: 
“In order for an emotional mechanism to work, it must circumvent reasoning in order 
to perpetrate a local irrationality that achieves a larger strategic end.”147  
 
The other advantage of an emotion-based mechanism is that emotions are “fast and 
frugal.”148 Hypothetically, natural selection could have endowed humans with a purely reason-
based mechanism for punishment, whereby all punitive decisions were made on the basis of 
rational cost-benefit analyses. However, a reason-based mechanism for punishment would have 
been slow, cognitively expensive, and may not have always achieved the most selectively 
advantageous outcome. A far more efficient mechanism, from an evolutionary perspective, was 
for individuals to simply experience an immediate surge of negative emotions in reaction to non-
cooperative behaviour. 
It is a somewhat disconcerting thought that the urge to punish wrongdoing was built into 
the psychology of humans by natural selection to secure reproductive success. For some reason, 
it is more natural to believe that intuitive reactions to wrongdoing are governed by reason, rather 
than emotion. But the fact that human punishment is emotionally-driven is typical of a more 
general pattern which applies to a wide range of human emotions and impulses. As Greene writes,  
 
“Nature doesn’t leave it to our powers of reasoning to figure out that ingesting fat and 
protein is conducive to our survival. Rather, it makes us hungry and gives us an 
intuitive sense that things like meat and fruit will satisfy our hunger . . . when nature 
needs to get a behavioural job done, it does it with intuition and emotion wherever it 
can.”149 
 
3.7. Answering the Central Question 
In §2.2, I presented a body of empirical evidence about the psychological motives of 
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punitive decision-making. The key finding from this body of evidence was that when people were 
asked abstractly about the justification of punishment, they provided a mixture of consequentialist 
and retributivist reasons. But while actually delivering punishment, people abandoned their 
consequentialist ideologies, and punished in a solely retributive manner. An equally important 
finding was that punitive judgment was driven by (and proportionate to) moral outrage. In §2.3, I 
raised the question: why is punitive decision-making psychologically motivated by emotionally-
driven retributivist intuitions, and not by considerations about the beneficial things that 
punishment brings about? In this chapter, I presented a biological story about the evolution of 
punishment in humans. Punishment was selected for the function of sustaining cooperation in 
groups of hunter-gatherers, by modifying the non-cooperative behaviour of free-riders and norm-
violators. And negative emotional reactions, such as anger and indignation, were selected for as 
the mechanism to motivate punishment among ancestral humans. 
In light of this evolutionary story, it is now possible to answer the question that I raised in 
§2.3. Punitive decision-making is psychologically motivated by emotionally-driven retributivist 
intuitions because negative emotions were selected for as the psychological mechanism for 
punishment in ancestral humans. Negative emotion was a selectively advantageous mechanism for 
punishment, because emotions reliably caused humans to punish. Automatic reactions of anger, 
contempt and indignation in response to wrongdoing were more effective and economical than 
reason-based cost-benefit analyses about the possible consequences of punishment. This explains 
why punitive decision-making is triggered by emotionally-driven retributive intuitions, and not by 
consequentialist considerations.  
Despite the absence of consequentialist reasoning in punitive decision-making, it is crucial 
to recognise that punishment evolved precisely because of the reproductively advantageous 
consequences that it brought about—specifically, increased within-group cooperation. Retributive 
emotions were instrumental to reproductive success, and this accounts for the fact that humans 
are, as Cushman puts it, “psychological retributivists.”150  
To be more accurate, the notion that humans have ‘retributive’ emotions and intuitions is 
somewhat misleading, because these emotions and intuitions are only ‘retributive’ in the sense that 
they seem to reflect retributivist theories of punishment. It is not difficult, however, to imagine 
why punitive emotions and intuitions evolved to track ‘retributive’ factors, such as the wrongdoer’s 
intention, extenuating circumstances, and the amount of damage caused by the wrongful act. 
Disproportionate punishment was costly to wrongdoers, punishers, and the group. Overly-severe 
punishment could cause excessive harm to the wrongdoer, which would in turn increase the 
likelihood of retaliation or resentment. And overly-lenient punishment was costly to the group, 
insofar as it that it would fail to effectively modify non-cooperative behaviour. 
 
4. Re-evaluating Retributivism 
In the previous chapter, I presented an evolutionary exposition of punishment. My aim in 
doing so was to explain why human punishment is psychologically motivated by retributive 
emotion, rather than consequentialist reasoning. The answer I arrived at, in essence, was that 
retributive emotion evolved as the psychological mechanism for punishment in ancestral humans, 
and that this psychological mechanism persists in modern-day humans. In §2.1, I mentioned the 
two main kinds of theories that philosophers offer when justifying punishment: consequentialist 
theories, and retributivist theories. Consequentialists hold that punishment is justified because of 
its future benefits. And retributivists, by contrast, hold that punishment is justified because guilty 
wrongdoers intrinsically deserved to be punished, irrespective of any future benefits, that might 
be brought about. How does the preceding evolutionary story about punishment bear on 
philosophical theories of punishment? And, more specifically, what is the relationship between 
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‘retributive’ emotions, which evolved as the psychological mechanism for punishment in humans, 
and the philosophical theory of retributivism?  
In effort to answer these questions, I will examine Joshua Greene’s theory of the two 
psychological processes that underpin moral judgement, and his evidence-based explanation for 
the existence of deontological moral philosophy.151 Greene’s work will serve as a point of contact 
between the evolution of human punishment and the philosophical theory of retributivism. 
  
4.1. Greene’s Theory of Moral Judgement 
In normative theory, deontology is roughly the idea that actions are morally right or wrong 
just in virtue of their internal features, and that right actions have a reason-providing authority 
(often expressed in terms of duties, or rules), that make them morally required.152 
Consequentialism, by contrast, is roughly the idea that whether an action is morally right or wrong 
depends only on the consequences of that action.153 Greene’s theory about moral judgement, in a 
nutshell, is that deontology and consequentialism are not first and foremost normative theories.154 
Instead, according to Greene, deontology and consequentialism are two dissociable and pre-
theoretic modes of moral thinking, which correspond with two natural kinds of psychological 
process. Deontological thinking, according to Greene, is generated by automatic, emotional 
processes; whereas consequentialist thinking is generated by deliberative, cognitive processes.155  
Greene’s theory might seem counterintuitive at first sight, because deontology is generally 
associated with the rational and dispassionate formulation of moral principles, rather than 
emotion. But Greene does not use the terms ‘deontology’ or ‘consequentialism’ in their ordinary 
sense. Instead, he characterises deontology and consequentialism functionally, in terms of two 
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distinct kinds of moral judgements.156 Characteristically deontological judgements, according to 
Greene, are those that place an emphasis on the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of actions, 
irrespective of the consequences of those actions.157 And characteristically consequentialist 
judgements, by contrast, are those that place emphasis only on the overall outcome of actions.158 
Put otherwise, consequentialist judgments have the form ‘X is wrong (or right) because it will bring 
about bad (or good) consequences.’ And deontological judgements have the form ‘X is just wrong 
(or just right), no matter what.’ 
In everyday contexts, the term ‘emotion’ is associated with feelings, and the term 
‘cognition’ is associated with thinking. But Greene introduces a novel definition of the terms 
cognition and emotion, in terms of two distinct kinds of psychological process.159 He defines 
emotion in terms of psychological processes that are fast, automatic, not necessarily conscious; 
and which have corresponding behavioural and physiological effects.160 The neural correlates of 
emotion, according to Greene, are the amygdala, posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal 
cortex, medial surfaces of the frontal and parietal lobes.161 And he defines cognition in terms of 
psychological processes that are slow, deliberative, neutral, and which do not trigger automatic 
behavioural responses. Cognition, according to Greene, is responsible for “reasoning, planning, 
manipulating information in the working memory, controlling impulses, and higher executive 
function”; and has neural correlates in the dorsolateral surfaces of the prefrontal cortex, and 
parietal lobes.162  
A common criticism of Greene’s theory is that cognition and emotion are not discrete 
																																																						
156 Greene, “Secret joke,” 37. 
157 Ibid., 39. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., 40.  
160 Ibid., 41. 
161 Ibid., 40. 
162 Ibid. 
kinds of mental process.163 Loader’s claim that people can have “thoughtful feelings and passionate 
thoughts” captures the core of the objection—that cognition and emotion are not discrete kinds 
of mental process.164 In my view, this objection is strictly speaking correct, but it is uncharitable to 
Greene’s intention in distinguishing between cognition and emotion. Greene’s aim is not to assert 
that cognition and emotion are sharply separable psychological processes. Rather, his aim is show 
that deontological and consequentialist moral judgements seem to be underpinned by two 
importantly different patterns of moral thinking.165 His distinction between cognition and emotion 
is an expository device, designed to pragmatically demarcate two aspects of human psychology. 
Having clarified Greene’s terminology, we are now in a position to return to his claim that 
deontology is generated by fast, automatic, emotional processes; whereas consequentialism is 
generated by slow, deliberate, neutral, and cognitive processes.166 To empirically test this idea, 
Greene designed and ran a large number of experiments to determine the psychological processes 
that occur while individuals engage in moral judgement.167 The general design of these experiments 
was to isolate deontological judgments from consequentialist judgements, by asking subjects 
hypothetical moral dilemmas while recording brain-imaging and reaction time data.168 To get a 
sense of the evidence that Greene provides in support of his theory, it is worth describing one 
such experiment. 
In the classic ‘trolley problem’ dilemma, a runaway trolley is hurtling towards five 
individuals tied to a train-track, who will all die if the trolley hits them.169 The agent is given the 
choice to pull a lever that will divert the trolley to a side-track, thereby saving the five individuals—
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but on the side-track, a sixth individual is tied down, who, if the lever is pulled, will be hit by the 
trolley and die. In a modified version of the trolley problem, known as the ‘footbridge problem,’ 
instead of a side-track and a lever, there is a large person standing on a footbridge over the train-
tracks.170 If the large person is pushed off the footbridge and onto the tracks in front of the trolley, 
the trolley will run into the large person’s body, and stop. The five individuals will be saved, but 
the large person will be killed. In this case, the moral dilemma is between two options: (1) push 
the large person to their death to save five lives, or (2) don’t push the large person to their death, 
which would result in five deaths. To test his theory of moral judgement, Greene hypothesised 
that subjects who chose option (1) when presented with the footbridge problem would tend to 
show more brain activity in regions associated with cognition, because they would necessarily be 
making a consequentialist judgement.171 The fundamental rationale behind pushing the large 
person off the bridge is that one death is better than five deaths—a cost-benefit analysis about 
consequences.172 Subjects who choose option (2) in the footbridge problem, by contrast, would 
tend to show more brain activity in regions associated with emotion, because they would 
necessarily be making a deontological judgement.173 Choosing option (2) shows an aversion to 
causing the death of the large person, despite an overall worse outcome (five deaths instead of 
one).174 Greene also hypothesised that reaction times for individuals who gave the consequentialist 
response would be slower than those who gave the deontological response, because the controlled, 
cognitive calculation that one death is better than five deaths would take time to override the 
automatic emotional aversion to pushing the fat man off the bridge.175 Both of Greene’s 
hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting a strong correlation between deontology and emotion; and 
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between consequentialism and cognition.176  
To establish a causal relationship between cognition and consequentialism, in addition to 
a correlation, Greene et al., instructed test-subjects to monitor a scrolling string of random 
numbers while providing a response to the footbridge dilemma.177 This modification was designed 
to impose a small load on the working-memory, leaving less cognitive resources for 
consequentialist reasoning. It was hypothesised that individuals who responded in a 
consequentialist way to the footbridge case would have slower response-times while under 
cognitive-loading than individuals who responded in a consequentialist way, but were not 
cognitively loaded. This prediction was confirmed, providing further evidence of the connection 
between cognition and consequentialism.178 Greene also hypothesised that cognitive-loading 
would have no significant effect on the response-times of individuals who provided the 
deontological response to the footbridge case, on the grounds that deontological judgements are 
inherently emotional, rather than cognitive. Again, this hypothesis was confirmed.179 
To clarify and lend support to Greene’s theory, it is worth addressing the main objection 
it faces.180  Namely, that consequentialist judgments are not solely the product of cognitive 
processes, and that deontological judgements are not exclusively emotion-driven.181 Greene 
acknowledges that emotion plays a role in consequentialist judgement, but he notes that the 
emotions which figure in deontology function like an ‘alarm bell’, whereas the emotions that figure 
in consequentialism function to inform the process of rational deliberation:182 
 
“The sorts of emotions hypothesised to be involved [in consequentialism] say, ‘Such-
and-such matters this much. Factor it in.’ In contrast, the emotions hypothesised to 
drive deontological judgment are far less subtle. They are . . . alarm signals that issue 
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simple commands: ‘Don’t do it!’ or ‘Must do it!’”183 
 
Greene also acknowledges that cognitive processes may play in deontological judgements: 
 
“One could, in principle, make a characteristically deontological judgment by thinking 
explicitly about the categorical imperative and whether the action in question is based 
on a maxim that could serve as a universal law.”184 
 
But he proposes instead that deontological judgements are seldom performed in this way, 
and that deontology is instead “affective at its core.”185 Hence, Greene circumvents the criticism 
that consequentialist judgments are not solely the product of cognitive processes, and that 
deontological judgements are not exclusively emotion-driven. 
 
4.2. The Link Between Moral Judgement and Punitive Decision-making 
For present purposes, the relevant aspect of Greene’s theory of moral judgement is his 
claim that characteristically deontological judgements are generated by emotion. This claim is 
commensurate with the psychological evidence about punitive decision-making that I outlined in 
§2.2, in that the retributive intuitions that motivated punitive judgement were driven by strong 
negative emotions such as moral outrage.186  
Greene’s explanation for why deontological judgment evolved also corresponds with the 
evolutionary story about human punishment that I described in §3.5.1–3.5.4. He explains that the 
emotions that generate deontological reasoning evolved for the biological function of motivating 
individuals to act in ways that “help spread [their] genes within a social context”—a direct link to 
the maintenance of cooperation in ancestral human life.187 Moreover, Greene also explains that 
emotion was selected as the mechanism for deontological judgement for its capacity to provide 
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“very reliable, quick, and efficient responses to recurring situations, whereas reasoning is 
unreliable, slow and inefficient in such contexts.”188 This explanation chimes with the evolutionary 
explanation of the psychological mechanism for punishment that I gave in §2.3.  
The fact that Greene’s evolutionary explanation for the emotional basis of deontology 
dovetails with the function of the emotion-based psychological mechanism for punishment is not 
a coincidence. Punitive decision-making is increasingly being treated as a species of moral 
judgment.189 And the fact that punitive decision-making is motivated by automatic, emotional 
reactions to non-cooperation, (and not by consequentialist considerations), indicates that punitive 
decision-making is species of what Greene refers to as ‘characteristically deontological judgments.’ 
That is, judgements that place an emphasis on the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of actions 
irrespective of the consequences of those actions.190  
 
4.3. Deontological Moral Philosophy as Post Hoc Rationalisation 
In this section, I will introduce and evaluate Greene’s explanation for the existence of 
deontological moral philosophy. Although his account applies to deontological philosophy in 
general, I will focus on its relation to retributivism. By retributivism, I mean the super-category of 
philosophical theories that purport to justify punishment by appealing to the notion that guilty 
wrongdoers intrinsically deserve to be punished. Greene’s explanation for the existence of 
deontological moral philosophy is derived from his theory that characteristically deontological 
judgements are driven by fast, automatic emotions and that these emotions evolved in humans for 
a selective function (see §4.1–4.2). 
Humans are a highly intelligent species, with a brain that continuously tries to make sense 
of the world. A large body of studies indicate, however, that humans, by virtue of their advanced 
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cognitive capacities, are prone to unintentionally justifying and explaining their own impulsive 
behaviours and emotional dispositions, when no such justification or explanation exists.191 In one 
study, subjects were induced to prefer a product via psychological priming, and it was found that 
they later explained their preference for completely unrelated reasons.192 In a different study, male 
subjects unconsciously misattributed anxiety and physiological arousal for sexual attraction.193 It 
was found that male subjects who interacted with an attractive female experimenter immediately 
after crossing a precarious bridge over a deep canyon (intended to be a frightening experience), 
were twice as likely to call her and to ask for date than subjects who were given time to rest and 
de-stress before the interaction.  
Evidence of the human tendency to post-hoc rationalise has also been revealed in cases of 
people with abnormal mental conditions. Patients with memory disorders are prone to making up 
stories to cover over their memory deficits, with no awareness of doing so.194 Individuals who are 
instructed to perform certain behaviours while under hypnosis will invent explanations for their 
behaviour even though it was caused by the hypnotist.195 And split-brain patients, whose cerebral 
hemispheres are disconnected from neuronal communication, are known to invent strange 
associations between completely unrelated objects when each of their hemispheres are shown 
different stimuli.196  
Although the human tendency to post hoc rationalise can only be made salient in 
experimental contexts, it is a widely-accepted fact that humans are prone to cognitively interpreting 
their own emotions and behaviours by unconsciously forming coherent explanations, especially 
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when no such explanations exist.197 By combining this psychological fact with the fact that humans 
are largely unaware of the extent to which the intuitions that dictate moral judgement are driven 
by automatic emotional reactions to wrongdoing, Greene infers that deontological moral 
philosophy, as it stands, is a post hoc rationalisation of the automatic emotions and intuitions that 
evolved in ancestral humans for a purely selective function.198  
 
“What should we expect from creatures who exhibit social and moral behaviour that 
is driven largely by intuitive emotional responses and who are prone to rationalisation 
of their behaviours? The answer, I believe, is deontological moral philosophy.”199 
 
In §3.5.4, I presented the empirically-supported view that negative emotion evolved as the 
mechanism for punishment in humans. This view coincided exactly with the psychological 
evidence about punitive decision-making that I examined in §2.2. Punishment was solely motivated 
by automatic retributive intuitions, which were driven by strong negative emotions in reaction to 
wrongdoing, such as moral outrage. And §4.1, I examined Greene’s theory and empirical evidence 
in support of the view that moral judgement—specifically, characteristically deontological 
judgement—is to a large extent motivated by motivated by fast, automatic, emotions. To explain 
this, Greene appeals to evolution by natural selection.200 He argues that emotions motivated 
ancestral humans to perform behaviours that were selectively advantageous, such as altruistic 
cooperation and punishment, and that this ancient psychology persists in the modern-day 
humans.201 This explanation accords with my account of the selection function of emotion in §3.6.   
Greene’s explanation for the existence of deontological moral philosophy amounts to the 
claim that humans extend their tendency to post hoc rationalise into the academic realm—by 
constructing elaborate, linguistically-formulated rationalisations in the form of deontological moral 
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philosophy. These rationalisations entail that actions are morally right or wrong just in virtue of 
their internal features, and that right actions have a reason-providing authority that makes them 
morally required. In Greene’s view, however, the content of these deontological theories is simply 
post hoc rationalisation of the emotionally-driven intuitions that influence human moral 
judgments.202  
 
“Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts 
to explain, in ‘cognitive’ terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having 
emotionally driven intuitions. . . Although these explanations are inevitably 
incomplete, there seems to be ‘something deeply right’ about them, because they give 
voice to powerful moral emotions.”203 
 
In Greene’s view, the reason why so much of human moral reasoning is characteristically 
deontological—‘X is just wrong (or just right), no matter what’—is that much of human moral 
intuition is driven by evolved emotional impulses.204 In other words, when humans experience a 
strong and automatic aversion to certain actions, such as stealing, or cannibalism; this feeling is 
the biological, alarm-like emotional mechanism that evolved for a selective function coming into 
effect.205 Given that humans are naturally inclined to interpret the world around them in a cognitive 
way, however, this evolved emotional mechanism consciously registers as an immediate, 
passionate urge for or against certain actions.206 In Greene’s view, these characteristically 
deontological moral intuitions are the cognitive interpretation of the visceral, emotions mechanism 
that evolved in ancestral humans. 
Some psychologists, such as Jonathon Haidt, go so far as to suggest that moral reasoning 
as a whole is likely to be little more than a rationalisation of our intuitive, emotional responses—
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as Haidt puts it, ‘the emotional dog wags the rational tail.’207 But Greene’s proposition is not as 
strong as this.208 Greene’s claim, in essence, is that deontological moral philosophy is nothing more 
than a sophisticated confabulation of the emotional impulses that evolved in ancestral humans for 
the function of motivating cooperation, punishment, and other social behaviours.  
 
4.4. The Deontological Challenge 
Before I explain how Greene’s account of deontological moral philosophy relates to 
retributivism, however, it is worth examining a counterargument to his thesis. Greene’s position 
on deontological moral philosophy, overall, is that it is nothing more than a sophisticated 
confabulation of the emotional mechanisms that evolved in ancestral humans for the function of 
motivating cooperation, punishment, and other social forms of behaviour. It is worth dwelling for 
a moment on the ambition of Greene’s claim. His conclusion threatens to explain away the entirety 
of deontological moral philosophy: a longstanding theory and esteemed normative theory. 
Excessive ambition is sometimes a worrying sign in philosophy—but the strength of Greene’s 
argument lies in his robust evolutionary explanation for the emotional source of deontology, and 
the large body of empirical evidence that he uses in support. Although I am inclined to agree with 
Greene, a compelling counterargument to his view needs to be addressed.  
Traditionally, deontological moral philosophy is anchored in rationalism.209 Roughly 
speaking, rationalism is the idea that reason and rationality are superior to the senses and 
sentimentality across all domains of philosophical inquiry.210 In the domain of ethics, rationalist 
approaches to morality generally hold that moral judgement is based first and foremost in belief, 
rather than in emotion.211 The overarching goal of rationalist deontological moral philosophy, 
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exemplified in the works of Kant, is to formulate an elegant and comprehensive set of fundamental 
moral principles, grounded in the intrinsic value of human beings, with the aim of determining 
right and wrong once-and-for-all.212 For this reason, rationalist deontology is sometimes associated 
with moral realism—the idea that there is an independent realm of moral facts that determine the 
truth of moral beliefs.213 As Greene writes,  
 
“[M]orals . . . stand alone like mathematical theorems, independent of the messy world 
of psychology. That is the deontological dream.”214 
 
Greene’s evidence for the role of emotion in deontology, and his evolutionary explanation 
for why moral emotions evolved, presents rationalist deontologists with a significant explanatory 
burden. Why should we believe that there exists a deep, independent moral truth, or set of perfect 
moral principles, when a significant portion of human moral intuitions are simply driven by 
emotions, the existence of which can easily be explained in terms of evolution by natural 
selection?215  
Although Greene’s account presents a major problem for rationalist deontologists—
certain contemporary deontologists seem able to resist his challenge. Constructivist deontologists, 
such as T. M. Scanlon, do not ground their conception of moral truth in the idea of a perfect set 
of independent, rationally attainable moral principles.216 Rather, they attempt to construct moral 
truth, via a process of rationally reflecting on the unrefined moral intuitions and commitments 
that humans share. Examples of these principles include a respect for persons, and an aversion to 
treating people as mere objects.217 The aim of constructivist deontology, broadly speaking, is to 
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refine these common intuitions and commitments into a set of moral principles, which will serve 
as a standard by which moral judgements can be justified.218 Ostensibly, constructivist 
deontologists are able to resist Greene’s claim that deontology is post hoc rationalisation, by 
admitting the evolutionary origins of characteristically deontological moral intuitions, whilst also 
constructing a deontological system of ethics in which moral principles have a reason-providing 
authority that makes them morally required.219  
Greene’s reply to this, however, is that the unrefined intuitions that go into the 
constructivist’s rational reflection process will invariably include emotionally-generated 
characteristically deontological judgements.220 So any set of moral principles that come out of the 
reflective process will necessarily contain post hoc rationalisation of emotions that evolved for a 
selective function. And the putative ‘moral truth’ found in the constructed set of principles would 
instead merely “reflect arbitrary features of our evolutionary history.”221  
Greene grants that it might be possible (at least in theory) to remove, or ‘filter’ out 
characteristically deontological judgments during the rational reflection process, thereby 
eliminating all emotionally-driven intuition from the constructivist’s final set of moral principles.222 
The resulting ethical system would certainly not contain any post hoc rationalization. But what 
would such an ethical system look like? In Greene’s view, it would look like the ethical system 
envisaged by the economist John Harsanyi in 1953.223 Drawing from the economic theory of 
rational decision-making under uncertainty, Harsanyi proposed the idea of ‘social welfare utility 
function,’ whereby ethical decisions could be made on the basis of an impartial calculation about 
the common morality of all human beings.224 On Harsanyi’s system, all ethical decisions would be 
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made from the perspective of an impartially-situated individual, whose interests and personal 
biases were totally removed by “being put in a situation of complete uncertainty about their true 
identity.”225 According to Greene, an ethical system such as Harsanyi’s would indeed eliminate 
post hoc rationalisation. But it would amount to little more than a “utilitarian philosophy mounted 
upon a would-be deontological foundation”—that is, a calculative method for weighing up right 
and wrong, based on a single moral principle.226 According to Greene, this kind of ethical system, 
though free of characteristically deontological judgments, would be more consequentialist than 
deontological. And, therefore, such a system would not serve as a counterexample to the claim 
that all deontological moral philosophy involves the post hoc rationalisation of emotion.227 
 
4.5. Retributivism as Post Hoc Rationalisation 
Having explicated and defended Greene’s explanation for the existence of deontological 
moral philosophy, I will now employ his account to explain the existence of retributivism.  
In §4.1, I raised the question: where does the philosophical theory of retributivism fit into 
the overarching evolutionary story about the biological function and psychological mechanism for 
punishment in humans? As I explained in §2.1, the term retributivism applies to a wide category 
of philosophical theories that attempt to justify punishment by claiming that guilty wrongdoers 
morally deserve proportional punishment, irrespective of any beneficial consequences that 
punishment brings about. The central principle of retributivism is ‘desert’—the idea that 
punishment is the morally required response to certain kinds of wrongful acts.  
Retributivism is often referred to as a ‘deontological’ theory of punishment, due to the fact 
that retributivists consider punishment intrinsically valuable, despite the good consequences that 
it might bring about. Given that retributivism is often described as a deontological theory of 
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punishment, it is unsurprising that its contents correspond with what Greene calls characteristically 
deontological judgments, which have the form ‘X is just wrong (or just right), no matter what.’ On 
retributivism, guilty wrongdoers just deserve proportional punishment—end of story. Yet according 
to Greene’s theory of the psychological processes that underpin moral judgment, characteristically 
deontological judgements are generated by fast, automatic, emotional reactions to wrongdoing, 
which evolved for the function of sustaining social behaviour in ancestral human groups.  
Ordinarily, retributivism is treated as a philosophical theory that emerged from rational 
reflection about the fundamental moral basis of punishment. But Greene’s theory of moral 
judgement seems to suggest that retributivism (one of the oldest and most widely-endorsed 
theories regarding the justification of punishment) is driven merely by moral emotions that evolved 
for the function of maximising reproductive success in ancestral humans. Could this be true? 
In chapter 3, I presented Bowles and Gintis’ hypothesis for the evolution of punishment 
in ancestral humans, to explain why punitive decision-making in modern-day humans is 
immediately motivated by emotionally-driven retributive intuitions, and not by considerations 
about the benefits of punishment. In the later stages of the Pleistocene epoch, hunter-gatherers 
were subject to a great number of survival pressures, including resource scarcity, a volatile climate, 
and the risk of lethal intergroup conflict. Groups comprising individuals with a predisposition for 
helping one another, even when doing so came with personal costs, had a significant reproductive 
advantage. Cooperation was highly beneficial, but it also opened the possibility for cheaters and 
norm-violators to exploit its benefits. To solve this problem, and to sustain within-group 
cooperation, ancestral humans evolved a mechanism for modifying the behaviour of non-
cooperative individuals. This mechanism, punishment, operated by motivating individuals to cause 
non-cooperators harm; which conditioned those individuals against non-cooperative behaviour in 
the future.  
In this chapter, I explicated and defended Greene’s explanation for the existence of 
deontological moral philosophy. According to Greene, deontological moral philosophy is nothing 
more than elaborate, systematic, verbally-expressed post hoc rationalisation of the moral intuitions 
and emotions that evolved for the function of maximising reproductive success in ancestral 
humans. By connecting my earlier evolutionary exposition of punishment with Greene’s 
explanation for the existence of deontological moral philosophy, it is now possible construct a 
tentative explanation for the existence of the philosophy theory of retributivism.  
Punishment, which evolved in humans for a selective function, is triggered by an emotional 
mechanism. This mechanism evolved because it was automatic, effective and reliable. Rather than 
performing slow, cognitive cost-benefit analyses about the long-term benefits of punishment, 
ancestral humans simply experienced automatic and visceral feelings of moral outrage in response 
instances of free-riding and norm-violation. The intensity of these negative emotions evolved to 
track (a) the blameworthiness of non-cooperative individuals, and (b) the magnitude of harm 
caused by the non-cooperative behaviour, because it was selectively disadvantageous to deliver 
punishment that was overly-severe, or overly-lenient. This ancient punitive psychology persists in 
modern-day humans (see §2.2).  
To a modern reader, the above-mentioned evolutionary story is quite intelligible. But none 
of the above was evident to the philosophers who were formulating the first justificatory theories 
of punishment, such as Kant, or Hegel. Instead, these philosophers were simply aware of a deeply-
held intuition—in their own psychology, and in that of others—that punishment was the 
appropriate response to wrongdoing. They engaged in a cognitive appraisal of this intuition, 
without knowing that they were interpreting an evolutionarily ancient psychological mechanism. 
They chose the concept of ‘desert’, or ‘deservingness’ to represent the irrepressible psychological 
impulse to punish wrongdoers that they were cognizant of. They chose the concept of 
‘proportionality’ to represent the strong psychological sense that punishing too severely or too 
leniently was wrong. And they systematised these concepts into the form of a justificatory theory: 
the idea that guilty wrongdoers intrinsically deserve to be proportionally punished. If this 
explanatory story is correct, then retributivism is not, first and foremost, a justificatory theory of 
punishment. Rather, retributivism is an elegant and systematic post hoc rationalisation of the 
emotionally-driven psychological mechanism that evolved to motivate punishment in groups of 
ancestral humans.  
The idea that retributivism is post hoc rationalisation raises several important raises 
questions. First, and most obvious, if retributivism is merely a post hoc rationalisation, then those 
who espouse retributivist theories of punishment are largely oblivious to both the psychological 
predisposition that motivates their position, and to the evolutionary origins of that predisposition. 
If the present view of retributivism is correct, should those who endorse retributivism continue to 
do so? According to Greene, and also Singer, the answer to this question is no—or, at least, not 
to the same extent. Greene claims that understanding the roots of one’s evolutionary impulses 
should reduce their moral authority.228 And according to Singer, “advances in our [evolutionary] 
understanding of ethics . . . gives us grounds for being less respectful of them.”229  
A different question that arises pertains to the philosophical literature on retributivism. 
For centuries, philosophers have provided diverse and illuminating formulations of retributivism, 
and penetrating analyses of the concepts of desert and proportionality. If retributivism is a merely 
a post hoc rationalisation, do these contributions lose their theoretical utility? Should retributivist 
doctrines continue to be taught in undergraduate law and philosophy courses? 
From these theoretical questions, further questions arise regarding practical matters, such 
judicial sentencing, punitive legislation, and the general administration of criminal justice 
institutions.230 Justificatory theories of punishment have real, downstream consequences for prison 
systems, sentencing regimes, and incarcerations rates.231 If retributivism is, in fact, simply a vestigial 
relic from the psychology of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, then why should it have a place among 
the jurisprudential principles that govern contemporary penal institutions? 
																																																						
228 Greene, “Secret joke,” 76. 
229 Peter Singer, “Ethics and intuitions.” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 3-4 (2005): 331-352, at 349. 
230 Hoffman, Punisher’s brain, 337. 
231 Ibid.  
In my view, each of the above-mentioned questions hinge on a broader problem, relating 
to the theoretical status of retributivism. Is it appropriate to continue to regard retributivism a 
justificatory theory of punishment? If retributivism is merely the post hoc rationalisation of an 
evolutionarily ancient psychological mechanism, then to my mind, retributivism should no longer 
be regarded as a justificatory theory of punishment. If the above conclusion is correct, then making 
a justificatory appeal to retributivism when delivering punishment is essentially the same—to put 
it crudely—as claiming: ‘my hunter-gatherer ancestors acted in this way, so I can act in this way 
too.’ Because of this, I am of the opinion that the theoretical status of retributivism qua justificatory 
theory should change. But what should it change to?  
Describing retributivism as ‘post hoc rationalisation’ is strictly speaking accurate, but it is 
also a somewhat pejorative label. In my view, a slightly less precise, but more charitable way to 
think about retributivism is from an evolutionary standpoint. Retributivism is the linguistic 
expression of an evolutionarily ancient psychological mechanism for punishment. Regarding 
retributivism in this way has three merits. First, it preserves the theoretical accomplishments of 
punishment theorists in formulating precise versions of retributivism, and in elucidating its core 
concepts. Second, it neutralises the idea that retributivism has any real justificatory power. And 
third, it explicitly acknowledges the connection between retributivism and our hunter-gatherer 
ancestry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The first aim of this paper was to provide an evolutionary explanation for why punitive 
decision-making in modern humans is motivated by emotionally-driven retributive intuitions. This 
aim was met in the form of an empirically-informed evolutionary exposition of the origin, 
phylogenetic distribution, selective function, and development of punishment, which culminated 
in the psychological mechanism for punishment: negative emotion. Anger, indignation, and 
outrage form the motivational mechanism for punishment in humans, and this explains why 
humans do not consider the consequences of punishment when making practical punitive 
decisions.  
On a more methodological note, the structure of my evolutionary exposition of human 
punishment—based on a modified version of Tinbergen’s framework—was advantageous, for 
three main reasons. First, it provided a clear demarcation between important conceptual 
distinctions in biology, such as the ontogeny–phylogeny distinction, and the mechanism–function 
distinction. Second, it divided up the explanatory labour in such a way that turned an otherwise 
opaque explanatory project into a relatively straightforward task. And third, it allowed for a diverse 
range of interdisciplinary findings to be coherently synthesised. 
The second aim of this paper was to re-evaluate retributivism from an evolutionary 
perspective. This aim was met by applying Greene’s ground-breaking explanation for the existence 
of deontological moral philosophy to the evolutionary exposition of human punishment that I 
provided in chapter 3. The finding from this re-evaluation was that retributivism is a post hoc 
rationalisation of the psychological mechanism that evolved to motivate punishment in ancestral 
humans. Undoubtedly, this finding has serious theoretical and practical implications—of which I 
was only able to offer a brief sketch. In my view, however, one implication is particularly 
conspicuous. Retributivism should no longer be accorded the theoretical status of a justificatory 
theory of punishment. To continue to treat retributivism in this way is to wilfully ignore the human 
proclivity for cognitively interpreting the emotion-driven mechanisms that were built into our 
psychology by natural selection.  
It is important to clarify however, that although I do not think retributivism should retain 
a reason-providing authority, I am certainly not of the opinion that it should be disparaged or cast 
aside in any way. Instead, I think that retributivism should simply be acknowledged for what it 
actually is—a refined linguistic expression of an ancient punitive predisposition. It is quite a 
remarkable fact, after all, that humans are able to philosophically reflect on, and verbally articulate 
the conscious registration of the emotionally-driven psychological mechanism that evolved to 
secure the survival and reproductive success of our hunter-gatherer ancestors.	
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